Watchdog: Noem's DHS Blocked Him at Least 11 Times. Trump Then Gave Her a New Post

Cuffari Appealed to Noem; She Considered Ending Inquiries Under §417(a)(2)

On March 2, 2026, Joseph Cuffari, the Department of Homeland Security's inspector general, told six congressional committee leaders that Kristi Noem's department had "systematically obstructed" his office's work.¹ He listed 11 instances of blocked access and reported additional denials and delays beyond it.¹ The barriers impeded a national-security criminal investigation and a review of DHS's intelligence handling surrounding the July 13, 2024 attempt to assassinate Trump.¹ A footnote added that Noem had asked for a list of all pending matters, including criminal investigations, "so that she may consider whether any audits, inspections, or investigations should be terminated under 5 U.S.C. § 417(a)(2)."¹

Noem was Trump's choice. He nominated her on January 20, 2025, and she was still his Secretary when Cuffari's letter arrived.²¹³ The letter attributes the restrictions to DHS officials and identifies no order from Trump.¹ Three days later, on March 5, Trump announced her successor and wrote that Noem, "who has served us well, and has had numerous and spectacular results (especially on the Border!), will be moving to be Special Envoy for The Shield of the Americas."³ Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed the appointment on March 7.⁴

Cuffari had appealed to Noem for help obtaining counterintelligence-database access on June 13, 2025; on September 5, the Director of National Intelligence sent Noem a memorandum calling for that access, OIG reported.⁵ On December 19, Cuffari asked Noem to resolve the broader set of access problems later listed in his letter to Congress.¹ General Counsel James Percival answered on January 30, 2026: DHS would not provide the requested access until Cuffari's Office of Inspector General (OIG) further explained its requests, according to both letters.¹

Investigators Lost Access They Needed to Check DHS's Work

Some of what DHS took away, the inspector general's office already had.¹ On November 19, 2025, at CBP's request, ICE revoked OIG's access to its Enforcement Integrated Database, ending approximately 10 years of access used for audits, inspections and risk analysis.¹ DHS also revoked criminal investigators' standing access to a database identifying employees and contractors eligible to see classified information.¹ Asking case by case, Cuffari said, created delays and risked exposing subjects of investigations to people with no need to know.¹

CBP blocked direct access to border-data systems, so OIG could not check whether the data were complete and reliable or conduct comprehensive risk analysis.¹ TSA supplied extracts from Secure Flight, its passenger-screening system, but Cuffari said OIG could not validate them.¹ In a congressionally mandated audit of TSA checkpoint screening, OIG said, the denial of Secure Flight access kept its analysis out of the draft report by its mandated date.⁵ OIG also reported that the checkpoint testing uncovered a serious finding posing a security risk to the traveling public, which Cuffari reported to Noem in a classified letter in August 2025.⁵

In the national-security criminal investigation, Cuffari said, the department's proposed conditions would force investigators to disclose details to people who might be connected to the allegations or subjects, risking the investigation and a potential prosecution.¹ DHS had committed, his table said, to counterintelligence-database access once the Director of National Intelligence authorized it; OIG obtained that authorization on September 5, 2025, and DHS's intelligence office still refused to honor the commitment.¹ For the assassination-attempt review, another intelligence agency had authorized access, but the same office refused the administrative step needed to admit Cuffari to the program.¹

OIG's semiannual report for April–September 2025 counted 23 distinct requests delayed or denied by five DHS components, impairing the timeliness and sometimes the execution of oversight work.⁵ The two tallies overlap and should not be added together. Some requests and restrictions predate Noem's tenure: OIG said DHS had repeatedly denied read-only system access for several years.⁵¹ For investigators, the cost was work they could not complete on time and data they could not independently check.⁵¹

DHS's Defense, and the Written Notice the Law Requires

DHS's strongest defense is in Percival's January 30 letter: an inspector general's access extends to records relevant to his oversight responsibilities, not unrestricted browsing of every system.¹ Percival argued that OIG had failed to explain the scope and legal basis of its requests, that classified information remained subject to need-to-know and originating-agency controls, and that the Secretary had statutory authority over sensitive inquiries.¹ He asked Cuffari to distinguish delays, refusals and disagreements over scope, and audits from criminal investigations.¹ At a House hearing on March 4, Noem denied blocking investigations and said Cuffari had not specified what he wanted or the timetable, the Associated Press reported.⁶

The statutory security power is real. 5 U.S.C. §417 allows the Secretary to prohibit certain sensitive audits, investigations or access when necessary to protect the specified information, preserve national security or prevent significant impairment of U.S. interests.⁷ But a Secretary who uses it must give the inspector general written reasons within seven days, and within 30 days of receiving them he must send that notice and his response to congressional leaders and committees.⁷ Otherwise, Section 406 grants him timely access to materials related to his responsibilities.⁷

Cuffari rejected Percival's description of his requests as unlimited: OIG gave components written notice of each audit, inspection or evaluation's subject, scope and objective, he said.¹ He also said Percival cited no law expressly limiting OIG's access, Noem had not invoked §417's procedure, and in both intelligence matters outside authorization was already in hand.¹

Percival also warned that notifying Congress of denied access would be in bad faith and border on a material misrepresentation.¹ On March 4, Senator Gary Peters announced a minority-staff investigation into potential obstruction of OIG's communications with Congress and called that warning unacceptable.⁸

Where It Stood on October 10, 2026

Several access problems did end. TSA, CBP and FEMA eventually supplied what is listed below, OIG reported, after delays that had disrupted its work.⁵

| What OIG received | When it arrived | Delay | | --- | --- | --- | | Complete TSA biometric-program systems and infrastructure information | August 25, 2025 | 174 days⁵ | | CBP passenger-system access and requested Operation Allies Welcome data tables | September 8, 2025 | 53 days⁵ | | FEMA Deployment Tracking System access | September 5, 2025 | 44 days⁵ |

OIG published the checkpoint-screening audit in November 2025 and announced completion of the biometric-screening audit on September 15, 2026.⁹¹⁰¹¹ On October 10, OIG still listed the assassination-attempt review as ongoing, without saying whether the barrier Cuffari identified in March had ended.¹²¹

Trump swore in Markwayne Mullin as Secretary on March 24, 2026, and DHS listed him in the post on October 10.¹³¹⁴

A different TSA watchlist audit, published July 28, 2026, reported prompt responses and no access delays or denials during its October 2024–June 2025 fieldwork.¹⁵ It also found reduced security and privacy risks from changes completed by July 2024, before Noem's tenure, and made no recommendations.¹⁵ The fieldwork preceded the checkpoint audit's July 2025 Secure Flight request.¹

A Watchdog Must Be Able to Check the Department's Work

This was not the only time Noem's DHS withheld information from overseers: the ranking members of three House committees also reported its refusal to release adviser Corey Lewandowski's financial disclosure.¹⁶

The charge is obstruction of independent oversight under the Secretary Trump chose.¹² According to Cuffari, DHS revoked access to a database his office had used for approximately 10 years and impeded a national-security criminal investigation, while Noem considered whether pending inquiries should end under 5 U.S.C. § 417(a)(2).¹ A department that prevents its watchdog from checking its work weakens the public accountability that watchdog exists to provide. After Cuffari reported that obstruction to Congress, Trump praised Noem's service and gave her another public post.¹³⁴ That is the case for impeachment: Trump used his own appointment power to keep entrusting public responsibility to the Secretary whose department's watchdog had just reported systematic obstruction. Congress should treat that failure of presidential accountability as an abuse serious enough to warrant impeachment.